

# Prior Specification in Bayesian Estimation Affects a Model's Fitting Propensity

---

Sonja D. Winter, PhD

Better Decisions Through Comprehensive Statistical Model Evaluation

April 14, 2023: NCME 2023, Chicago



Missouri Prevention  
Science Institute

University of Missouri



# Model Fitting, according to frequentists

new evidence  
(likelihood)

$$\frac{p(data | \theta)}{p(data)}$$

number of  
parameters

configuration  
of the model

# Model Fitting, according to Bayesians

existing information  
(prior)

$p(\theta)$

×

new evidence  
(likelihood)

$\frac{p(data | \theta)}{p(data)}$

=


updated information  
(posterior)

$p(\theta | data)$


# Can Priors make a Model More Selective?

- When a model 'fits well', it does not tell us anything about the a priori likelihood of that model fitting *any plausible data*
  - Some models have a worryingly high tendency to fit any data patterns (i.e., high fitting propensity; FP; Preacher, 2006)
  - Without constraining such models, finding good fit is 'nearly meaningless' (Roberts & Pashler, 2000)
- Can we return meaning to good model fit?
- Can we use a series of increasingly fine-grained prior specifications to ensure that our model fits well only to data that align to our theory?
  - Extending work by Vanpaemel (2009; Vanpaemel & Lee, 2012)

# Priors as Filters



# Example of a Model with high FP: The Bifactor Model



# Criticism of the well-fitting Bifactor Model

- “Indiscriminate use of the bifactor model without proper regard for theory is **highly questionable**.” (Thomas, 2012, p. 108)
- “[W]e caution against the adoption of a theoretical model that is built on **a methodological house of cards**.” (Watts et al., 2020, p. 318)
- “[T]he bifactor model has an **undesirable tendency** to fit any possible data” (Bonifay & Cai, 2017, p. 481)
- “[T]he mistaken inference of bifactor superiority seems to be driven by the general dimension’s **erroneous accommodation of misspecifications** through capturing theoretically unexplained variance and repackaging it as common variance, even though it is not.” (Greene et al., p. 756)

# Theory-Informed Constraints of the Bifactor Model


Watts and colleagues (2019) proposed two theory-informed constraints for psychopathology bifactor model parameter values:

1. A bifactor model should produce reliable **specific factors** that are **well represented** by their constituent indicators.
2. If the **general factor** in a bifactor model reflects broad liability for psychopathology, it should be **relatively equally represented** by its constituent indicators.

We can translate these constraints to prior *filters*



# Priors as Filters




# Priors as Filters

all possible  
data



'unconstrained'  
bifactor model

constraints on loading  
magnitudes and their  
equivalence

constraints on  
loading  
magnitudes




Filter 1:  $\lambda \sim N(\mu = 0, \sigma = 10)$



# FP Analysis to Test Priors as Filters

1. Generate 5000 random data sets of  $N = 500$  with 15 variables
  - ockhamSEM R package (Falk & Muthukrishna, 2021)
2. Fit bifactor model with diffuse priors (Filter 1)
  - blavaan R package (Merkle et al., 2021)
3. Assess model fit
  - Bayesian SRMR  $\leq .12$ 
    - This index does not have same cutoff guidelines as frequentist SRMR
4. Good fit? → Apply Filter 2 Priors
5. Still good fit with Filter 2? → Apply Filter 3 Priors


# FP Analysis Results



55% of all possible data  
got through the  
'unconstrained' *bifactor*  
*model filter*

Model — Filter 1 (54.92%) — Filter 2 (16.58%) — Filter 3 (0.18%)

# FP Analysis Results



Only 0.18% of all possible data got through the *most fine-grained filter* (well-represented + equally well-represented)


**Model** — Filter 1 (54.92%) — Filter 2 (16.58%) — Filter 3 (0.18%)

# Applying Filters to a Single Data Set


- Thurstone verbal intelligence tests (Thurstone & Thurstone, 1941)
- $N = 213$

## Frequentist Model Fit:

$\chi^2(18) = 24.33, p = .144,$   
 $CFI = .994,$   
 $RMSEA = .041, 90\% CI [.000, .078]$



# Applying Constraints to Example





# Conclusions & Implications

We can use Bayesian priors to constrain statistical the bifactor model!

- This general procedure can be applied to any statistical model/type of parameter
- We can use priors to constrain the complexity of any model for which priors can be specified
  - Return meaning to *good model fit*
- We need more insight into:
  - How to specify proper priors for specific sample and model sizes
  - What goodness of fit indices are best

# Thank you!

---

✉ [sdwinter@missouri.edu](mailto:sdwinter@missouri.edu)

🐦 [@winterstat](https://twitter.com/winterstat)

# Questions? Feedback?

---



# But is Good Fit Meaningful?

<i>Verbal Aptitude</i>	
Reading Sentences	0.766
Reading Vocabulary	0.789
Sentence Completion	0.752
First Letters	0.607
Four Letter Words	0.596
Suffixes	0.570
Letter Series	0.566
Pedigrees	0.661
Letter Grouping	0.529

<i>Verbal Comprehension</i>	
Reading Sentences	0.487
Reading Vocabulary	0.451
Sentence Completion	0.404

<i>Word Fluency</i>	
First Letters	0.613
Four Letter Words	0.505
Suffixes	0.393

<i>Inductive Reasoning</i>	
Letter Series	0.726
Pedigrees	0.246
Letter Grouping	0.408

# References

- Bonifay, W., & Cai, L. (2017). On the Complexity of Item Response Theory Models. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 52(4), 465–484.
- Falk, C. F., & Muthukrishna, M. (2021). *ockhamSEM: Tools for studying fit propensity in structural equation modeling*. R package version 0.1.2.
- Greene, A. L., Eaton, N. R., Li, K., Forbes, M. K., Krueger, R. F., Markon, K. E., ... & Kotov, R. (2019). Are fit indices used to test psychopathology structure biased? A simulation study. *Journal of abnormal psychology*, 128(7), 740.
- Levy, R. (2011). Bayesian Data-Model Fit Assessment for Structural Equation Modeling. *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, 18(4), 663–685.
- Lewandowski, D., Kurowicka, D., & Joe, H. (2009). Generating random correlation matrices based on vines and extended onion method. *Journal of Multivariate Analysis*, 100(9), 1989–2001
- Meehl, P. E. (1978). Theoretical risks and tabular asterisks: Sir Karl, Sir Ronald, and the slow progress of soft psychology. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, 46, 806–834.
- Merkle E.C., Fitzsimmons E., Uanhoro J., Goodrich B. (2021). Efficient Bayesian Structural Equation Modeling in Stan. *Journal of Statistical Software*, 100(6), 1-22.
- Murray, A. L., & Johnson, W. (2013). The limitations of model fit in comparing the bi-factor versus higher-order models of human cognitive ability structure. *Intelligence*, 41(5), 407–422.
- Myung, I. J., Pitt, M. A., & Kim, W. (2005). Model evaluation, testing and selection. In K. Lambert & R. Goldstone (Eds.), *Handbook of Cognition*. Sage Publications Ltd.
- Preacher, K. J. (2006). Quantifying Parsimony in Structural Equation Modeling. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, 41(3), 227–259.
- Stan Development Team (2022). *RStan: the R interface to Stan*. R package version 2.26.13.
- Thomas, M. L. (2012). Rewards of bridging the divide between measurement and clinical theory: demonstration of a bifactor model for the Brief Symptom Inventory. *Psychological assessment*, 24(1), 101
- Vanpaemel, W. (2009). Measuring model complexity with the prior predictive. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 22.
- Vanpaemel, W. (2020). Strong theory testing using the prior predictive and the data prior. *Psychological Review*, 127(1), 136–145.
- Vanpaemel, W., & Lee, M. D. (2012). Using priors to formalize theory: Optimal attention and the generalized context model. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review*, 19(6), 1047–1056.
- Watts, A. L., Lane, S. P., Bonifay, W., Steinley, D., & Meyer, F. A. (2020). Building theories on top of, and not independent of, statistical models: The case of the p-factor. *Psychological inquiry*, 31(4), 310–320.
- Watts, A. L., Poore, H. E., & Waldman, I. D. (2019). Riskier tests of the validity of the bifactor model of psychopathology. *Clinical Psychological Science*, 7(6), 1285–1303.